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Abstract
Turkey’s foreign policy towards Africa has been still a new phenomenon not only for 
Turkish society but also for the Continent and international arena as well. Turkey’s 
policy on Africa represents an approach, active involvement rather than a component 
of concrete and ongoing relations. Also, it is early to recognize this policy as detailed 
one. According to government’s official declarations “opening era” was terminated 
and current period signifies strategic partnership era between Turkey and Africa. In 
spite of this fact “opening” still continues in the strategic partnership period. Some old 
patterns are used in addition to new patterns like seeking African states’ cooperation 
in fight against terrorism. Some differences exist in implementation and formulation of 
African policy during different terms of the AK Party’s governance.
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Özet
Türkiye’nin Afrika’ya yönelik dış politikası gerek Türkiye toplumu gerekse kıta ve 
uluslararası arena için hâlâ yeni bir fenomeni teşkil etmektedir. Türkiye’nin Afrika 
politikası somut ve devam eden ilişkilerin bir öğesinden ziyade bir yaklaşımı, aktif bir 
dahiliyeti temsil etmektedir. Ayrıca bu siyaseti detaylı olarak tanımlamak için henüz 
erkendir. Hükümetin resmî açıklamalarına göre “açılım dönemi” sonlandırılmıştır ve 
mevcut dönem Türkiye-Afrika arasında stratejik  ortaklık dönemini temsil etmektedir. 
Buna rağmen stratejik ortaklık döneminde “açılım” halen devam etmektedir. Çeşitli 
eski yapıların yanında terörizmle mücadelede Afrika devletlerinin işbirliğini arama 
gibi yeni unsurlar da eklenmektedir. AK Parti yönetiminin çeşitli evrelerinde Afrika 
siyasetinin uygulanmasında ve oluşturulmasında farklılıklar bulunmaktadır.
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Introduction
The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to the fore with the 
claim to change Turkey’s internal perception not only towards domestic 
politics but also towards formulation and implementation of its foreign 
policy. Also, the Turkish government wants to alter international 
community’s perception on Ankara’s foreign policy. In fact AK Party’s 
foreign policy towards Africa indicates its aforementioned different 
approaches regarding policy formulation and implementation.1 
The AK Party’s active involvement in Africa marked new beginning 
for the Turkish Republic’s overall policy on the Continent; but there 
have been also differences in implementation and formulation of 
this policy during different terms of the AK Party’s governance. For 
instance, the AK Party came to power in 2002, it was only after the 
year of 2005 that it focused and gave more importance on African 
policy. In 2014, on the other hand, it was revealed that the opening era 
was completed and strategic partnership era was started.
In this essay, under the AK Party’s governments Turkey’s policy 
towards Africa will be analyzed by focusing on several issues like 
security after the second half of the 2000s. It will be acclaimed 
that Turkey’s foreign policy towards Africa has been still a new 
phenomenon not only for Turkish society but also for the Continent 
and international arena as well. Actually it will be mentioned that the 
Turkey’s policy on Africa represents an approach, active involvement 
rather than a component of concrete and ongoing relations. Also 
it is early to recognize this policy as detailed one. According to 
government’s official declarations current period signifies strategic 
partnership era between Turkey and Africa. In spite of this fact 
“opening” still continues in the strategic partnership period. Some old 
patterns are used in addition to new patterns like seeking African states’ 
cooperation in fight against terrorism. 
These both old and new patterns of approach/active involvement 
are mainly stemmed from the AK Party’s goal of presenting itself as a 
1  In this essay, with the term ‘Africa’ the author refers to the 55 members of the African Union 
including Morocco.
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successful actor both in domestic politics and foreign affairs. Hence, 
relations with the African states help Ankara to present and underline 
its “changing status in international politics from recipient country to 
net donor country”. However still in this strategic period, future of 
this kind of involvement relies largely on Turkey’s efforts to develop 
its relations with Africa. Because till this day, African states haven’t 
shown same degree of interest and haven’t taken as much steps as 
Ankara has done for intensifying cooperation. For this reason, Turkey 
must formulate and implement multi-dimensional foreign policy in a 
realistic manner to get desired steps from Africa. Most importantly, 
apart from the economical aspect of bilateral relationship, Ankara must 
underline other important dimensions needed by African states like 
security. 
1. Security Aspect of the AK Party’s Approach 
Towards Africa 
A brand-new aspect was added to Ankara’s involvement in Turkey 
in the mid-2010s: security dimension. It has linked both with 
domestic and foreign affairs. Fight against terrorism, participating 
into international efforts on stability and its contribution on military 
missions in particular African states are most crucial components of 
this new aspect. Ankara’s contribution into anti-piracy missions in 
the Horn of Africa and its opening of military training base in near 
future in Somalia have been outstanding actions regarding security 
aspect of Turkey’s involvement in Africa. Actually, this domain related 
with stability has the potential to surpass economic aspect of Turkey’s 
African relations; even to redefine them.
Nevertheless, the AK Party’s decision to include Africa into its fight 
against Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization (FETO), underscores 
security aspect. In fact, recent diplomatic steps’ or initiatives’ main 
drive can be recognized as explaining FETO and its threats not only to 
Turkey but also to the African states. In another words, Ankara wants 
Africa’s cooperation in its fight against FETO. In this conjunction, 
the FETO and its activities in the Continent have taken most of the 
attention. For instance with opening schools since the late 1990s, 
before the AK Party’s rule, FETO wanted to spread its vision of Islamist 
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beliefs and get support of African society. With the start of the AK Party 
era, FETO increased its activities both in Turkey and in international 
arena due to convergence of some beliefs and interests with the AK 
Party and heads of leading state institutions of the Turkish Republic. 
For a peculiar period, the government and the Gülen Movement had 
mutually beneficial relations in opening to Africa. The AK Party 
facilitated and helped the Gülenist movement and in return Turkish 
effects were increased on certain African states. The government 
supported such activities by assuring public that they changed Africa’s 
perception regarding Turkey and gave some advantages in Turkey’s 
competition with other international actors. Moreover, one has to bear 
in mind that apart from developing relations with Africa the small and 
medium sized business communities-now affiliated with FETO- have 
another common point with the government: they had belonged to the 
same conservative Islamist tendency. For this reason, the government’s 
relations with those communities and its support result in questioning 
whether the AK Party’s agenda on Africa had any religious dimension.
Furthermore, some additional examples on civil society 
organizations with Islamist identity can be given. The Foundation for 
Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (İnsan Hak ve 
Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı), infamous for the Mavi Marmara 
Incident, has conducted different types of civil activities in nearly 41 
African states. The Confederation of Businessman and Industrialists 
of Turkey (Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu, 
TUSKON), on the other hand, lost its status so do its validity internally 
and externally due to its connection with FETO. Its members are 
arrested on the grounds of membership in a terrorist organization, 
founding and executing a terrorist network.2 Henceforth some 
useful tools are ceased to be exist and one dimension of soft-power 
is left missing; waiting to be fulfilled by other non-governmental or 
governmental institutions.
Approachment to Somalia, relations with Somalia provide some 
answers for Ankara’s insistence to formulate and then pursue policy 
2  “TUSKON dahil dev şirketlere ‘FETÖ’ operasyonu; 187 iş adamı hakkında gözaltı kararı”, 
T24, http://t24.com.tr/haber/tuskon-dahil-dev-sirketlere-feto-operasyonu-187-is-adami-hakkinda-
gozalti-karari,355555, 18 August 2016, (Accessed on 14.04.2017).
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to Africa.  There have been several dimensions like educational and 
economic ones that AK Party have referred in its relations. However 
more recently security dimension has also increased its place in the 
bilateral agenda. The terrorist organization Al-Shabab’s attacks on the 
Turkish targets, Ankara’s negotiator role in Somali affairs and lastly 
Turkey’s goal of opening a military training base in Somalia have 
effects to alter nature and content of Turkey’s rapprochement to Africa.
Al-Shabab’s reaction towards Turkey evaluates “Somalia’s” 
articulation and recognition of Ankara’s policies. From time to time, 
al-Shabab has conducted terrorist attacks against Turkish targets. 
It declares that it is against Turkey’s actions in Somalia due to the 
fact that Ankara has supported secular institutions and Mogadishu 
government. To Ankara, the terrorist organization is not comfortable 
with Turkey’s humanitarian help and support to Somalia so al-
Shabab’s displeasure becomes one of the reasons for attack. Moreover 
the Turkish Republic’s active role in negotiations between Somalia and 
Somaliland may trigger terrorist attacks. 
The Turkish Republic’s military actions can be another reason for 
al-Shabab terrorist attacks against the Turkish targets. Ankara has 
participated into efforts on establishing security in Somalia and regions 
near to the war-torn country. Since 2011, Ankara has provided military 
aid as well. Turkey commanded the Combined Task Force between the 
dates of 1 September-1 December 2010 in the Gulf of Aden, in the 
Indian Ocean and costs off Somalia.
Moreover, Ankara supports the United Nations Support Office for 
African Union Mission in Somali. According to the Turkish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Turkey is on the list of states providing “the highest 
amount of voluntary contribution to Somalia in addition to the regular 
contributions assessed by the UN”.3
Turkey’s military training base in Mogadishu is another crucial 
example. When opened it will be Turkey’s first and biggest military 
3  Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkey’s Approachand Contributions to 
the United Nations Peace keeping Operations”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-approach-and-
contributions-to-the-united-nations-peacekeeping-operations.en.mfa, (Accessed on 03.04.2017).
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training base in overseas. 200 Turkish military personnel will educate 
nearly 500 Somali troops every year in their mission against al-Shabab. 
Also through educating Somali soldiers it is aimed to improve security 
situation of the country. The base will include three military camps. 
Its location is also important due to the fact that it is close to airport in 
Mogadishu and the Port of Mogadishu.4
2. Turkey’s African Involvement Since the End of the 
“Opening Era”
The foreign policies implemented and conducted by Turkey, provides 
ground for legitimization of the AK Party5 both domestically and 
internationally. Therefore, the Justice and Development Party has used 
various devices in its policy implementation such as the soft power. The 
term soft-power that is frequently mentioned by the government circles 
entails the argument that apart from hard issues such as security related 
subjects; “Turkey’s diplomatic, economic, cultural and historical ties 
have importance in formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy”.6 If this 
definition is taken into account then it can be clearly said that with 
relying on soft-power devices the AK Party opened a new window for 
Turkey’s Africa policy. 
The number of official visits can clearly indicate this involvement 
to Africa. For instance, before the AK Party’s coming to power only 
two official visits were conducted to sub-Saharan Africa: in 1969 
then president Cevdet Sunay went to Ethiopia and in 1996 then 
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan visited Nigeria. However, by the 
figures of January 2013, there were 21 visits from Turkey to Africa 
on the level of president, prime minister and foreign minister. On the 
African side, 26 state visits were conducted.7 Later in January 2015 
President Erdoğan visited Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti; in March 
4  “Turkey Trains Somalis to Kill Al-Shabab”, The New Arab, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/
News/2017/3/20/Turkey-sends-aid-opens-biggest-military-base-abroad-in-Somalia, 20 March 
2017, (Accessed on 04.04.2017).
5  İlhan Uzgel, “DışPolitikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele”, İlhan Uzgel-Bülent 
Duru, eds., AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu, Phoenix Yayınevi, Ankara 2009, s.358.
6  Uzgel, op. cit., s. 359.
7  “What does PM Erdogan’s visit to Gabon-Niger-Senegal tell us?”, Africa News, http://www.
africanews.com/site/list_message/44858, 21 January 2013, (Accessed on 19.06.2013).
ANKASAM | Bölgesel Araştırmalar Dergisi
147December 2017 • 1 (3) • 141-163
2016 he visited Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Gana and Guinea8. Recently 
in January 2017, he paid official visits to Tanzania, Mozambique and 
Madagascar however these last visits are different in nature due to the 
fact that they constitute first visits of a Turkish president.
One of the most underlined peculiarities of Turkey’s rapprochement 
to Africa is that it dominantly rests on rhetorical power. Symbolic 
presentation is always made by the Turkish government to legitimize 
its African policy. This rhetoric focuses mostly on “win-win” claims, 
using of soft power device, reference to Ottoman past. By underlying 
the “win-win” claim, the Turkish administration has tried to convince 
Africa that bilateral relationship will be beneficial for both actors. 
However, persisting on highlighting “win-win” dimension indicates 
that in fact African states may have doubt concerning their bilateral 
relations with Turkey. For this reason the leaders of the AK Party and 
the members of cabinet have often emphasized Ankara’s intent in this 
cooperation and historical dimensions of these relations. Henceforth, it 
is aimed to emphasize that there is no hidden agenda for the AK Party’s 
opening to Africa.
In a way Turkish foreign policy on Somalia can illustrate the 
dichotomy present in Turkey’s soft-power dilemma that centers on 
persisting in being an international actor despite political and economic 
shortcomings. Somalia, as for African politics, has significant 
importance that is not limited solely to the Continent. Due to its strategic 
location and its instability crisis, this war-torn country can disaffect 
the developments not only in Africa but also in its near regions. Taken 
granted this importance Turkey has been aware of the fact that its 
policies and steps towards Somalia can make her a prominent actor in 
international arena and can boost its visibility internally and externally. 
For instance during the 2011 crisis when Somalia could not get desired 
help from the UN Ankara took the lead for providing help and support. 
However, Ankara has limited capacity to have a role in Somalia’s 
affairs. Due to the fact that Somalia’s neighbours especially Kenya and 
Ethiopia have taken the lead in cooperative relations with Somalia not 
8  For details regarding visit please look to: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
“Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-iliskileri.tr.mfa, (Accessed on 
19.06.2017).
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only in economics but also in national reconciliation process as well. 
However; Turkey’s religious approach and its reference to the Ottoman 
history hat constitute important parts of its soft-power, with the support 
of economic, military dimensions may facilitate its role in Somalia. For 
instance Turkey may want to spread her vision of Islam against Iran’s 
penetration with using religious tool like building mosques that can be 
recognized as presenting “itself as a legitimate and authentic religious 
authority…opening to promote Turkey’s vision of Islam as part of a 
functioning democratic state”.9
One has to bear in mind that referring to religious devices to support 
Somalia is frequently used phenomenon especially by the Middle East 
states like in relations between Egypt and Somalia or between Saudi 
Arabia and Somalia. For instance Egypt’s well-known and important 
religious institution Al-Azhar’s influence on some of the Somalia’s 
notorious political movements provided grounds for Turkey to use its 
own religious tools especially for spreading its vision of “moderate 
political Islam”.
Thus one can assume that soft-power used in the AK Party’s 
approach to Africa, encompasses the political dimension of bilateral 
relations and cooperation so that critics increasingly focus on soft 
power. One of the most common critiques is that the AK Party’s foreign 
policy dominantly rests on soft power which can prevent elaboration of 
this policy according to strategic terms. In this dimension voluntary 
associations get most of critiques. They have been active in various 
dimensions and facilitated Turkey’s penetration into Africa. These 
institutions as examples for soft-power; conduct health, education 
and sanitary campaigns that directly affect Africans’ daily lives. At 
this point, soft power concept has been perceived and used as general 
framework for Turkish foreign policy and these non-governmental 
actors have been treated as essential actors for formulating and 
conducting this policy.
Another rhetorical aspect used frequently by the AK Party, has been 
the claim of pursuing a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Turkey’s 
9  Mubaraz Ahmed, “Why Would al-Shabaab Target Turkey?”, Religion and Geopolitics, 18 
December 2015, http://www.religionandgeopolitics.org/turkey/why-would-al-shabaab-target-
turkey, (Accessed on 24.03.2017).
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opening to Africa has been portrayed as the Party’s diversification of 
its foreign policy or indication of multi-dimensional character of its 
foreign policy. However, this claim does not hide the fact that Ankara’s 
involvement to Africa was launched with its own problems and issues. 
One issue is that such relationship has already its own limitations which 
sometimes result in questioning the AK Party’s policies and rhetoric 
towards Africa because most importantly Turkey has lacked the 
necessary capacity and means to compete with Africa’s other partner 
states especially with China. However Ankara has some peculiarities 
that China and other prominent actors of the international society lack: 
giving attention to proportionality in pursuing relations, soft-power, 
religion and usage of religious dimension. In terms of Somali politics, 
unlike China, Turkey has not been criticized for “prioritizing” her own 
interest, Ankara’s approach towards Somalia has not been “visibly 
criticized as disproportionately benefiting Turkey”.10 The AK Party, 
with its religious means, has tried to increase its relations with Africa’s 
Muslim states. For this reason, through its soft power devices and 
Turkish civil society organizations Ankara has tried to improve its ties 
with Africa in health, education and construction areas.
This First Africa-Turkish Cooperation Summit of 2008 also entails 
some relevant points that can be used to evaluate Turkey’s African 
policy. For instance, whether the documents “The Istanbul Declaration 
on Turkey-Africa Partnership: Solidarity and Partnership for a Common 
Future’’ and its annex ‘‘Framework of Cooperation for Turkey-Africa 
Partnership’’ adopted at the Summit, lead to improvement of bilateral 
relations still lacks clarity. To put it in another way, it is hard to say 
that this Summit opened new grounds for “win-win situation” for both 
actors. Also the Implementation Plan remains ambiguous whether 
it facilitates bilateral relations and cooperation. For instance in this 
declaration of 2008 there were no direct or concrete reference to 
Turkey’s candidacy for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
membership for the 2009-2010 terms and no mentioning of Africans’ 
support for Turkey’s candidacy. Instead, in the document, it was solely 
mentioned that the UNSC had important role and responsibility to 
solve security problems.
10  Gizem Sucuoğlu-Jason Stearsn, “Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigms of Aid”, South 
African Institute of International Affairs, Research Report, No: 24, November 2016, s. 32.
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Moreover, it is estimated that the institutional mechanism prepared 
in the First Summit falls behind Ankara’s agenda for intensifying 
cooperation like First High Level Officials Meeting of the Turkey-
Africa Partnership that was held in Istanbul on 15 December 2010 in 
which ‘‘2010-2014 Turkey-Africa Partnership Joint Implementation 
Plan’’ was adopted.  According to Birnur Fertekligil who was former 
deputy under secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Africa 
and Multilateral Foreign Affairs, “these initiatives have given a 
considerable momentum to” Turkey’s African policy.11 Furthermore 
First Ministerial Review Conference of the Turkey-Africa Partnership 
was took place in Istanbul in December 2011. The African turn out 
was actually high; fifty-three states were participated. But there was 
low level of political participation as 35 states were represented by 
the level of ministers. Nevertheless according to the Turkish officials, 
positive outcomes were reached at the Summit. They argued that in 
the Conference bilateral relations and steps taken since 2008 were 
elaborated and future projects were planned.
Turkey has continued on some strategic projects which can create 
framework of its bilateral relationship with Africa. The second summit 
of cooperation between Turkey and Africa can be given as an example. 
3. African Dimension of “Win-Win” Relations: The 
Continent’s Response 
To make comments on success of the AK Party’s foreign policy, 
African response has to be taken into account. Actually since the 
AK Party’s acceleration of its African policy in 2005, the Continent 
has been ambiguous in answering those Turkish steps. Also Africa’s 
interest towards Turkey develops slowly.12 One reason may be Africa’s 
lack of material and human resources. Nevertheless new and additional 
steps from Africa are needed to comment the AK Party’s approach as 
successful.
11 “Opening Speech Delivered By H.E. Ambassador Birnur Fertekligil, Deputy Undersecretary 
Of The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs For Africa And Multilateral Political Affairs At The High 
Level Preparatory Meeting”, African Union, 15 December 2011, pp. 1-5, https://goo.gl/eiC8J4, 
(Accessed on 17.01.2012).
12  Mehmet Özkan, “A New Actoror Passer-By? The Political Economy of Turkey’s Engagement 
with Africa”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol: 147, No: 1, 2012, p. 121.
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Africa has been aware of Turkey’s steps and recently gives positive 
responses to Ankara.13 Put it differently, Africa recognizes the AK 
Party’s moves as an opportunity that can be used for its development. 
For example, in 2009, during former President Abdullah Gül’s visit to 
Kenya, former Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga said that bilateral 
relations constituted crucial and efficient factors to realize UN’s 
Millennium Development Goals like halving extreme poverty rates for 
his country.
Especially after 2005, African states made some gestures.The first 
high-level visit from the African Union to Turkey was also took place 
in 2005 when Prof. Alpha Oumar Konare as the Chairperson of the 
African Union Commission visited Turkey.Furthermore in the same 
year, Turkey acquitted the status of observer member of the AU to 
participate to the Organization’s ordinary sessions. In addition to this, 
the AU declared Turkey as its strategic partner in 2008.14
Furthermore, Turkey’s relations with the Continent’s crucial 
organizations are perceived as useful step to increase cooperation 
and used tosupport Turkish claims on the success of African policy. 
For instance Turkey became the 26th non-regional member of the 
African Development Bank in 2013-although it was expected in 2008, 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 2008. 
Moreover in 2005 Turkish Embassy in Abuja is accredited to the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Turkish 
Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam is accredited to East African Community in 
2010.
On the other hand the African Union has tried to implement some 
steps to complete and strengthen its relations with Turkey alongside 
its other strategic partners such as China, South Korea and the 
EU. According to the AU Summit’s Decision on Africa’s strategic 
partnership dated February 2013, it was mentioned that the needed and 
accurate steps have to be taken by the AU for preparing to the Second 
Cooperation Summit between Turkey and the AU. Furthermore it was 
13  Mehmet Özkan, “Turkey’s Rising Role in Africa”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol: 9, No: 4, 
Winter 2010, p. 98.
14  China, India and South Korea are other strategic partners of the continental organization.
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recalled to implement six priority projects of Financial Road Map and 
provide information requested by the Turkish government.15
Africa also has been aware of certain missing points that can 
disaffect strengthening bilateral cooperation. To give as an example, 
then African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security Ramtane 
Lamamra during the First Ministerial Meeting of the “Africa – Turkey 
Cooperation Summit” held in 2011 in Istanbul, acknowledged the fact 
that Turkey’s approach to Africa did not solely center on economic and 
trade areas. In fact Lamamra acclaimed that Ankara’s policy towards 
Africa had a comprehensive dimension that entailed fight against 
diseases, irrigation, energy and education, the maintenance of peace 
and stability in Africa.16 However it was also mentioned that both 
actors could achieve more if they would identify “some prioritized 
programmes and projects mutually agreed upon for implementing in 
short and medium terms”.17 In other words African side knew that some 
deficiencies existed against strengthening this relationship even in the 
short and medium terms. According to John K. Shinkaiye who was the 
Chief of Staff to the Chairperson of the African Union Commission 
and participated in the Opening Session of Senior Officials Meeting 
of the Africa–Turkey on behalf of the African Union Commission, 
application manner of the Joint Implementation Plan was very slow.18 
“Innovative steps” were needed “to achieve concrete deliverables”19 
in addition to the improvement of financial mechanism to implement 
these projects and strategies.
15  “AU Summit: Decision on Africa’s strategic partner ships”, SAFPI: South African Foreign 
Policy Initiative, 04 February 2013, http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2013/au-summit-decision-
africa-s-strategic-partnerships, (Accessed on15.02.2013).
16  “AUC Commissioner for Peaceand Security, Ramtane Lamamra And Representative of H.E 
Dr. Jean Ping Chairperson Of The African Union Commission On The Occasion of the First 
Ministerial Meeting of the ‘Africa-Turkey Cooperation Summit’”, African Union Commission, 
16 December 2011, Istanbul-Turkey, p. 3, https://goo.gl/VMBXCd, (Accessed on 18.01.2013).
17  Ibid.
18  “Remarks by Amb. John K. Shinkaiye Chief of Staff, Bureau of the Chairperson of the African 
Union Commission on the Occasion of the Opening Session of Senior Officials Meeting of the 
Africa-Turkey”, African Union Commission, 15 December 2011, Istanbul-Turkey, p. 3, https://
goo.gl/a7J2p2, (Accessed on17.01.2013).
19  Ibid.
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4. Still Opening to Africa or Strategic Partnership with 
Africa
Mid-2010s’ developments on Turkish-African relations are evaluated 
to figure out the essence of Ankara’s policy to the Continent. This 
period provides several facts to analyze Turkey’s whole approach and 
to make comparisons between the opening era and the era of strategical 
partnership.
The most important and interesting development is convening 
of Second African-Turkish Cooperation Summit in 2014 in 
Equatorial Guinea. With the title of “A New Model for Partnership 
for Strengthening of Sustainable Development and Integration of 
Africa” it was meant to evoke the fact that the initial relationship or 
cooperation model had to change or was changed. 30 African states 
participated to the Summit in which economical and historical relations 
were elaborated. Education and health were highlighted as important 
areas for cooperation and meanwhile Turkey’s financial aid to Africa 
would continue. Several decisions and declarations like the Joint 
Implementation Plan of Africa-Turkey Partnership 2015-2019 were 
accepted. Henceforth a new time table was set for a particular period of 
time and a framework regarding 2015-2019’s relations was prepared. 
Especially development goals had utmost importance regarding 
strengthening the current framework.  In 2019 third summit will be 
convened in Turkey.
According to the Turkish government circles, these developments 
represent successes which have to be supplemented with new goals. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu acclaimed in 2014 
that all goals accepted during the 2008’s Turkey-African Cooperation 
Summit were realized so that Turkey’s opening to Africa was 
successfully completed20. These developments like adopting the Joint 
Implementation Plan can be recognized as crucial components that 
demonstrate institutionalization of bilateral relations and henceforth 
improvement of relations.
20  “Çavuşoğlu’nun Makalesi Afrika Basınında”, Anadolu Ajansı, 17 November 2014, http://
aa.com.tr/tr/politika/cavusoglunun-makalesi-afrika-basininda/100791?amp=1, (Accessed on 
14.04.2017).
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President Erdoğan’s latest visits to the Continent are also efficient 
to show some details and new materials that further can be used to 
compare and contrast different terms of the AK Party’s governance 
and African states’ reactions as well. In January 2017; he paid official 
visits to Tanzania, Madagascar and Mozambique.These visits provide 
some important facts to reveal current phase of Ankara’s engagement 
in Africa and so do the Continent’s reactions. Foremost of all, they 
include first steps, examples regarding the AK Party’s approachment. 
First time a Turkish president paid an official visit to Mozambique and 
Madagascar. Moreover, regarding the relations between Turkey and 
Madagascar this visit was a first official visit from Turkey.
Another premier point is that the AK Party uses these visits as 
an indication of new beginning of mutual relations. The Turkish 
Presidency recognizes these visits as an indication of Africa-Turkey 
partnership politics. To put it in another way, to Ankara, Turkey’s 
African politics is transformed from the opening level to partnership 
level and that transformation is put into action by concrete steps.
Another first step, regarding the visits is Turkey’s demand of 
cooperation in its fight against terrorism particularly FETO. Turkish 
schools/sect schools, entrepreneurship that had connections with the 
Gülen Movement, once a prominent factor in relations with Africa, 
now are included into spectrum of Turkey’s fight against FETO. In 
presidential level, Ankara demands from African authorities to close 
or transfer these institutions to legal ones decided by Ankara and 
take some legal measures against the members of FETO, the persons 
affiliated or have connections with FETO. By revealing active presence 
of FETO members in Mozambique, for instance, Turkey directly 
indicates that it closely follows the situation on the ground.
Adding security dimension to this framework in which development 
of economic and political relations have been constant elements; 
indicates that separation of soft power-hard power will be valid in 
Turkey’s relations towards Africa. It is expected and demanded from 
the African states to give a positive answer to this changing situation, 
to comfort with this new framework. In another words soft-power 
which has been common aspect of Turkey’s engagement in Africa 
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will be supplemented with hard-power components like fight against 
terrorism.
To replace FETO and other related institutions the AK Party 
represents and highlights several official institutions. Some of them are 
familiar from the opening era like Turkish Cooperation and Coordination 
Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, TIKA) and 
the Foreign Economic Relations Board (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu, 
DEİK). However nowadays they are officially presented to the African 
counterparts “the one and only” official institutions to make business 
with. TIKA as one of the crucial actor of Turkey’s opening to Africa 
process, now is decided as the highest institution in executing relations 
with the Continent. Opening of new office in Darrusselam during the 
January 2017 visit, revealing of goal to open an office in Madagascar 
can be recognized as one of the examples on presenting TIKA officially 
and transforming into more active institution. DEIK is represented as 
the official and legal institution to cooperate with against FETO’s trade 
activities and its trade entrepreneurship. Another new institution is the 
Maarif Foundation. It is demanded from the African states to transfer 
Turkish schools to this foundation.
Another important component characterizing these visits so do the 
bilateral relations is Ankara’s continuation of policies, actions from 
“the opening era” even in this so-called “strategic partnership” era. 
To give as an example main focusing point of these visits is economic 
cooperation. Like in his previous official visits a separate delegation 
of businessmen accompanied Erdoğan in his recent visit. Under the 
coordination of the Ministry of Economy and organization of DEIK 
this delegation made some consultations with African counterparts. 
Business forums were held in the capitals of three states. The opening 
area’s usual components like presenting Africa as a new market 
for Turkey and new opportunities for business also can be seen in 
Erdoğan’s latest visits. The Turkish government that has aimed to 
take the lead in relations with Africa has made comparisons with the 
Western world regarding those relations. Such comparison that was 
used in the opening area is used at the partnership era as well. For 
instance even today, Turkey’s no-colonial history is kept underscoring 
officially. So through these examples of ideological foreign policy 





156 Aralık 2017 • 1 (3) • 141-163
rhetoric Turkish government has wanted to indicate that it has had 
different approach on Africa when it is compared with Western 
states. In this context, one of the important dimensions of AK Party’s 
approach to Africa is overemphasizing its Ottoman roots and Ottoman 
legacy in its rhetorical aspect. Because according to the government 
circles, such an emphasis on history facilitates to highlight differences 
between Turkey and her European counterparts. This comparison not 
only simplifies opening new opportunities but also gives Turkey the 
chance to indicate its non-colonial history. Henceforth ideology can be 
used to legitimate a foreign policy decision, action aim and a demand 
to international system21.
Furthermore, African dimension of “win-win” relation comes 
to the front. The opening era’s most emphasized component, has 
been centered on Ankara’s argument that it aims to pursue mutually 
beneficial cooperation. Also related with the “win-win equitation” 
Ankara has demanded from Africa to give positive and proportional 
replies. For instance, Ankara expects from Africa to open embassies in 
Turkey’s capital.
How will Tanzania, Mozambique and Madagascar answer Turkey’s 
demands? Demand on cooperation in fight against FETO, can be 
recognized as intervention into African states’ internal affairs. Hence 
some states may slow down the process of transferring the schools and 
taking legal actions against persons related with FETO or may demand 
additional information from Ankara. In fact, the Continent’s attitude 
regarding FETO does have no integrity; the policy is changing from 
one state to another. Somalia, Gine and Niger as conforming Turkey’s 
political line transferred these schools. Kenya hasn’t taken any action 
that will be appreciated by Ankara. Related documents were signed with 
several states like Chad, Sudan and Senegal. Ankara, for the short term, 
can focus on closing and transferring schools. Several media organs 
claim that FETO suspects have been in Mozambique and Madagascar. 
Several developments that may take place in Turkey, Greece and USA 
in its fight against FETO can affect Turkey’s bilateral relations with 
21  Mehmet Seyfettin Erol-Emre Ozan, “Dış Politikada İdeolojinin Rolü”, Dış Politika Analizinde 
Teorik Yaklaşımlar: Türk Dış Politikası Örneği, Ertan Efegil-Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, ed., Barış 
Kitap, Ankara 2012, p.371.
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Africa on that matter. Demand of expulsion of some persons can come 
to the agenda or Ankara may demand to fasten precautions in Africa’s 
fight against FETO.
Conclusion
The AK Party’s active involvement in Africa can be attributed to three 
things. Firstly, the Party has claimed pursuing multi-dimensional 
foreign policy. The government circles have always mentioned that the 
AK Party’s opening to Africa has a comprehensive dimension entailing 
several different headings like transportation, telecommunication, 
agriculture, peace and security. This character is also related with 
Ankara’s aim of making differentiation between herself and leading 
actors of the international arena regarding policies towards Africa. 
According to the Turkish government such attitude would bring 
new opportunities in terms of intensifying bilateral relations. For 
instance one theme that is most underlined is Turkey’s desire to 
make contributions to Africa’s development as a part of “sustainable 
cooperation”.
Secondly the AK Party has used Africa policy to indicate its claim of 
Turkey as becoming “a global actor” which is capable to formulate and 
implement policies regarding problems of instability. Also it has aimed 
to underline “signals of Turkey’s taking steps in its transformation 
from regional powerhouse to global leader”.22 Somalia policy can 
be given as an example. Thirdly, to deal with the international fiscal 
crisis, especially after 2009, Turkey chose Africa as an opportunity 
to overcome its negative effects. In fact economic dimension of 
Africa policy always surpasses other aspects of the AK Party’s active 
involvement into the Continent.
In addition to this, the AK Party implies that it has a new approach 
on the Black Continent which focuses on the theme of “New Africa”. 
This theme which relies more on sub-Saharan Africa actually aims to 
promote an image of Africa as a stable and peaceful place. To put it in 
another words, it shows that Ankara wants to change Turkish society’s 
22  Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, “11 Eylül Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasında Vizyon Arayışları ve ‘Dört 
Tarz-ı Siyaset’”, Gazi Akademik Bakış, Cilt: 1, Sayı: 1, Kış 2007, p. 53.
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perception on Africa as backward place so that the government can 
assure the continuation of bilateral relationship and cooperation23.
To talk about “win-win” relation, it is crucial that Africa supports 
such relationship; it is needed that Africa takes some steps and maintains 
them. Opening of embassies, signing of free trade agreements, closing 
or transferring schools connected with FETO, African leaders’ 
implementation of the map drawn by Ankara on bilateral relations are 
Turkey’s expectations from the African states. Moreover, Turkey has to 
convince its African partners that Turkish-African relations are based 
upon “win-win” principles24.
In spite of the AK Party’s interest; its policy towards Africa has 
fallen short of its actual agenda/program since the opening era. This 
situation results in two questions that have to be replied to elaborate 
its policy towards Africa. First of all, do the AK Party’s steps towards 
Africa represent an approach or a policy towards Africa? Rather than 
detailed and concrete policy, it will be more accurate to elaborate 
this renewal of relations as an approach whose continuation in the 
long run may result in adoption of concrete policy that will focus 
on intensification of a relationship and bilateral cooperation. Hence 
in the long run it will be answered whether Turkey’s opening and 
strategic partnership to Africa constitute a part of detailed policy.If 
active involvement and concrete relations continue and Ankara gets its 
desired responses from Africa, then a detailed policy can be adopted. 
Put it differently this opening can be perceived as a new beginning, a 
new step for improved relations for both actors; and strategic era can 
be labeled as both continuation of opening and grounding this opening 
into a solid ground, fulfilling deficits. In this strategic era both old and 
new concepts, presentations and names are used so this newness can 
question whether it is still opening or strategic partnership era.
Second question is that whether Turkey-Africa relations will exist 
in the long run. Current phase of relationship may represent a short-
23  Özkan, a.g.m., Winter 2010, p. 97.
24  Mehmet Seyfettin Erol-Ahmet Said Altın, “Türk Dış Politikasında Afrika: ‘Osmanlı Mirası 
Üzerine Ortak Gelecek-Etkinlik Arayışları’”, Mehmet Seyfettin Erol-Ertan Efegil, ed, Türk Dış 
Politikasında Güvenlik Arayışları: “Temel Faktörler, Kavramlar, Aktörler, Süreç ve Gelişmeler”, 
Barış Kitabevi, Ankara 2012, p. 234.
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term approach conditioned by both external causes such as global fiscal 
crisis and internal causes such as presenting an image of Turkey as 
powerful actor in international politics. On the other hand the Turkish 
government has acclaimed that its policy concerning Africa has long 
term effects and would be part of a durable relationship. In this regard, 
strategic components of politics are referred to legitimize the steps and 
projects. For example, the Horn of Africa is represented as one of the 
most important strategic regions of the world in the future so that it 
was convenient to make investments and try to intensify relations.
Even in the process of strategic partnership, opening to Africa 
still continues: some first steps are taken, policies are implemented 
and furthermore several examples of discourse and policies from the 
opening era are still used. Can strategic partnership be founded on 
the opening and those first steps? And can such strategic partnership 
endure? Africa’s responses mostly will affect the direction of strategic 
partnership and it is estimated that Ankara will closely watch rise or 
decline in bilateral relations. Erdoğan’s 2017 visit indicates that new 
components are added to the Turkish-African relations, but also old 
patterns are remained and used. First official visits at the presidential 
level were made to Mozambique and Madagascar. In addition to this, 
Turkey comes up with strategic partnership program which is a new 
framework on conducting bilateral relations and presented it to Africa. 
Inclusion of Turkish schools within the measures of fighting against 
FETO indicates that at the political level it is passed from soft power 
to hard power and henceforth components regarding hard power are 
launched in the relations between Africa and Turkey. Within two years 
President Erdoğan visited 10 African states, made similar contacts 
in spite of this fact concerns and demands on fight against terrorism, 
cooperation in security were highlighted in his latest visit. In addition 
to this during his visits to Djibouti, Somalia and Ethiopia in the year 
of 2015, he mentioned his thoughts on schools and institutions with 
FETO connections to his African counterparts. During his February 
2016 visit to Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Gine some first steps were taken 
as well: it was the first time that Turkish president paid an official visit 
to the Ivory Coast.
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To sum up, the AK Party, compared to previous administrations, has 
done a lot to intensify relations between Turkey and African states. Not 
only political or strategic but also economic and social steps are taken 
to get desired response from Africa. The AK Party; by concluding 
agreements, convening international summits, official visits and giving 
scholarship to African students prepared framework of relations with 
Africa. Turkey’s strategic moves such as overture to Somalia may 
help to materialize the AK Party’s claim that Turkey will help Africa 
in various dimensions; not restricted solely to economic domains . 
Now it is time to continue these steps through real political moves like 
opening military training base. Because the AK Party’s rapprochement 
towards Africa has been recognized as part of efforts that “reduce 
foreign policy directly to diplomacy”25. For instance former Foreign 
Minister Davutoğlu stated Turkey’s involvement in Africa constituted 
part of not only “rhythmic diplomacy” but also “serious and sustained 
development in the field of diplomacy”26.
25  Uzgel, op. cit., p. 364.
26  Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, Insight Turkey, 
Vol: 10, No: 1, 2008, p. 82.
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